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INTRODUCTION
From Facemash to Facebook to Meta, Mark Zuckerberg’s path and company have been fraught with conflicts, controversy, and even illegality.1 Did
he steal the idea from the Winklevoss brothers? Has he invaded people’s
privacy? Does he care about privacy? Does he mean what he says?2 Does
he respect the law? Does he respect his shareholders? Does he respect his
stakeholders? The answer to all of the above appears to be, no.
Zuckerberg has never played by the rules. Instead, from the beginning,
he appears to have operated as if he were above the rules, not subject to
regulation, and outside the zone where other people’s concerns about privacy
or false information were infringements on his rights instead of the reverse. His
response, time and again, is to apologize, pay a fine if required, and then repeat
the process. Yet, the harm created by Facebook is real and extensive—from
human rights violations to election outcomes to teenage girls contemplating
suicide—Facebook’s reach is massive and its choices seemingly unchecked.
Zuckerberg apparently ignores the law, his fiduciary duties, the harm his
choices create, and the role of social license. He appears to operate Facebook as
* Associate Dean for Strategy, Agnes Williams Sesquicentennial Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center and Professor of Management, McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University. I am deeply grateful to Claire Creighton, Jing Xu, Annie
O’Connor, and Spencer Perkins for their research assistance and to The Honorable Jed Rakoff,
Rebecca Boon, Lisa Fairfax, Marc Gross, Caz Hashemi, Don Langevoort, Dorothy Lund, and
participants at the 2022 Institute for Law and Economics Policy conference for their suggestions and comments.
1
Facemash was the initial Harvard version, complete with “attractiveness rankings” that
landed Zuckerberg in front of Harvard’s Administrative Board for privacy and emotional distress concerns. See, e.g., Katharine A. Kaplan, Facemash Creator Survives Ad Board, THE
HARVARD CRIMSON (Nov. 19, 2003). https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2003/11/19/face
mash-creator-survives-ad-board-the/.
2
Zuckerberg testified to Congress that Facebook platforms are not harmful to children.
Disinformation Nation: Social Media’s Role in Promoting Extremism and Misinformation:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 117th Cong. (2021) (statement of
Mark Zuckerberg, creator of Facebook, Inc.). Internal research available to Zuckerberg had
previously revealed Facebook platforms “make body image issues worse for 1 in 3 teen girls.”
Keith Zubrow et al., Whistleblower’s SEC complaint: Facebook knew platform was used to
“promote human trafficking and domestic servitude, CBS NEWS (Oct. 4, 2021), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/facebook-whistleblower-sec-complaint-60-minutes-2021-10-04/.
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if it were his own private company, emphasizing growth, scale, and profits
over the law, stakeholders, and safety. He operates without candor and
appears to run roughshod over the norms and internal controls designed to
ensure both that the company’s corporate governance mechanisms are
functioning and that it achieves sustained, profitable, and compliant growth.
As a result, the time has come to engage in a thought experiment,
using Facebook and Zuckerberg as examples, about whether and when
external governance controls should be imposed. This is a company,
perhaps aptly now-named Meta, with a reach that exceeds its bounds, and
the actual and potential harm it can do extends well beyond the shareholders
and owners. The company’s impact and its harms cross borders, impacting
not just users, but the public more broadly. That reach is key to its revenue
and growth model, and, without strong corporate governance, it is also key
to the harms it imposes. In short, as this article reveals, Zuckerberg’s cycle
of harm, apology, fine, repeat, indicates that he (and through him the
company) seemingly will not or cannot self-impose limits.
In normal course, the company’s board would set those limits by effectuating the internal controls inherent in good corporate governance. Those
controls are designed to mitigate conflicts and agency costs and to build
profits, trust, and social license within the bounds of the law. Effective internal controls operate through candor and creative friction. Yet, these controls,
along with candor and creative friction, appear to be missing at Facebook.
Instead, as the case study in this article reveals, Facebook apparently
suffers from sustained and systemic governance challenges that, like Fox
News before it, have not been resolved, prompting the analysis herein
about the use of outside monitors.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the story and scandals of Facebook, detailing its impact on stakeholders. From users, to human
rights victims, to the governments of the United States and many other countries, Facebook plays a role in legal violations and tragedies. Facebook has
paid a “price” for some of these and not for others, and in many cases, it has
denied any role in or responsibility for horrendous circumstances and violence. Part II discusses Facebook’s board, its internal controls (or lack
thereof), its choices, operations and governance, and how those choices connect to publicness, social license, and fiduciary duties. This analysis reveals
that the harms that Facebook imposes across countries and borders are
likely connected to, and even rooted in, the gaps in its internal controls. In
essence, Facebook’s
choices and structure are precluding it from
monitoring itself and therefore, external governance may be
warranted. Part III explores the Fox News Scandal and the resulting
public monitoring system in operation at Fox, proposing consideration of
a monitoring structure for Facebook that could deter further bad acts and
push it on the path to rehabilitation and self-governance.
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SCANDALS

Facebook is a company for which the scandals are unending. Consider
the most recent—the eight whistleblower complaints filed with the SEC by
former employee, product manager, and engineer, Frances Haugen (Haugen
Complaints).3 These complaints raise allegations about the 2020 election,
hate speech, the impact of Instagram on young girls, human trafficking, domestic servitude, and more. All of the complaints focus on the distinction
between what Facebook said publicly and what the internal documents actually say.4 This is classic securities fraud,5 which is, of course, illegal and at
least one example of potential lawbreaking on Facebook’s part. The focus
of this article, however, is not securities fraud. Instead, this article addresses
the additional support the Haugen Complaints lend to the argument
that Facebook should not be trusted to govern itself and may be in need of
the friction that an outside monitor would provide.
The allegations in the Haugen Complaints are many, varied, and worth
discussing in some detail. Haugen’s argument is that the extent to which the
company puts its interests above those of its users is alarming.6 Profit over
safety and people appears to be the mantra, and profit comes from behavioral advertising (advertising that is targeted to specific users through the use
of their browsing history).
The documents to which Haugen refers cover a wide array of issues.
For example, the documents indicate that Facebook was aware of Instagram’s
toxicity.7 Indeed, it was aware that Instagram was causing body image issues and suicidal thoughts for teenage girls.8 Yet, just one month prior to the
release of the documents, Facebook told members of Congress that its apps
had a positive impact on users9 and dodged questions about the contradictory
internal research Haugen later exposed.10 This incident alone indicates that
Facebook’s statements cannot be trusted.
The allegations about teenage girls are, however, just the tip of the
iceberg. Documents also reveal that contrary to other statements and
comments, Facebook treated some users as special, i.e. “whitelisted,” and
3

Zubrow et al., supra note 2.
Id.
5
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951).
6
Ryan Mac & Cecilia Kang, Whistle-Blower Says Facebook ‘Chooses Profits Over
Safety’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/03/technology/whistleblower-facebook-frances-haugen.html.
7
Zubrow et al., supra note 2.
8
Georgia Wells et al., Facebook Knows Instagram Is Toxic for Teen Girls, Company Documents Show, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 14, 2021, 7:59 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebookknows-instagram-is-toxic-for-teen-girls-company-documents-show-11631620739?. And despite the internal research, Facebook was in the process of creating an Instagram Kids Service
for children 13 years old or younger. It has now paused development of it. See, e.g., Adam
Satarian & Ryan Mac, Facebook Delays Instagram App for Users 13 and Younger, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/27/technology/facebook-instagram-forkids.html.
9
See, e.g., Mac & Kang, supra note 6.
10
Zubrow et al., supra note 2.
4
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subject to review through the XCheck (cross check) process.11 Big users
with big followings, those who are “newsworthy,” “influential or popular,”
or “PR risky,” are treated differently from regular users—even when
their posts contain harassment or incitement to violence.12 In fact, there are
over 5.8 million “whitelisted” accounts.13
The power of being a whitelisted user was real. When Neymar, a Brazilian soccer player with 150 million Instagram followers posted retaliatory
revenge porn against a woman accusing him of rape, Facebook’s system prevented its deletion. Over 56 million Facebook and Instagram followers saw
the revenge porn, it was reposted 6000 times, and the victim was harassed
and bullied.14 Yet, a “normal” or non-whitelisted user posting revenge porn
might have had their account blocked, suspended, or deleted.15
Neymar’s account, however, was left active.16
Again, despite Facebook’s public comments to the contrary, a 2019 internal review of whitelisting concluded that the favoritism was widespread,
not defensible, and a “breach of trust.”17 Nevertheless, Zuckerberg has repeatedly said publicly that all users are on equal footing, using it as an example of why Facebook matters—because, he says, it creates transparency and
equality.18 Although the company says it has now suspended its whitelisting
practices, in a typical lack of transparency and candor, it has not provided a
date on which the practice was ended.19
Other documents released by Haugen raise further questions. For example, the documents reveal that insiders know more about the company’s role
in the 2020 election and 2021 attack on the Capitol than previously revealed.20 The company knew about extremist movements and groups attempting to undermine democracy and polarize Americans.21 Indeed,

11

Id.
Jeff Horwitz, Facebook Says Its Rules Apply to All. Company Documents Reveal a
Secret Elite That’s Exempt., WALL ST. J. (Sep. 13, 2021, 10:21 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/facebook-files-xcheck-zuckerberg-elite-rules-11631541353.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Says It Deleted 865 Million Posts, Mostly Spam, N.Y. TIMES
(May 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/technology/facebook-removal-postsfake-accounts.html.
16
Neymar was never charged with rape. The woman was charged with slander and extortion (charges were dropped) and fraud (she was acquitted). Dan Milmo, Facebook: Some HighProfile Users ‘Allowed to Break Platform’s Rules’, THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 13, 2021), https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/sep/13/facebook-some-high-profile-users-allowed-tobreak-platforms-rules.
17
Horwitz, supra note 12.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
The Facebook Papers and their fallout., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/10/25/business/facebook-papers-takeaways.html.
21
Id.
12
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documents indicate that these problems are not restricted to the United
States, describing Facebook’s role in India as “amplified.”22
Perhaps even more troubling is the idea that Facebook’s own product
design is at the root of the problem. Or, put differently, the way in which
Facebook’s site functions along with the features it continues to create to
encourage users to engage in social networking actually create an atmosphere in which “misinformation and hate speech flourish.”23 The company
has apparently known for a while that “likes” and “shares” are most often
deployed by users to amplify “toxic” content. The company also knew that
modifications to help manage this issue are possible. But Facebook
blocked the changes “in the service of growth and keeping users
engaged.”24 After all, user engagement is key to behavioral advertising
revenue.25
Importantly, these troubling allegations are only the most recent. As
long as Facebook has existed, Zuckerberg appears to have operated outside
of the rules and laws, without transparency or candor, and has been
“apologizing” for his choices. There is a pattern to the issues. Facebook
makes a software design choice that emphasizes profits over privacy and
users, but does not reveal the implications of the design with candor or
transparency. Why? Because if users choose privacy, advertisers will
complain and behavioral advertising revenues will decline.
Nevertheless, users do complain, and when they do, Facebook’s response appears to be waiting to respond until pressure mounts. For example,
in September of 2006, Zuckerberg apologized for Newsfeed.26 The design
of Newsfeed, a type of social software, resulted in all users’ posts being
re-vealed in one centralized place.27 Advertisers were pleased and users
were surprised.28 His response: “we did a bad job of explaining what the
new features were and an even worse job of giving you control of
them.”29 Translation: “We did not explain how we planned to share your
information, nor did we create transparent, easy, or accessible methods for

22
Sheera Frenkel & Davey Alba, In India, Facebook Grapples With an Amplified Version
of Its Problems, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/23/technology/facebook-india-misinformation.html.
23
N.Y. TIMES, supra note 20.
24
Mike Isaac, Facebook Wrestles With the Features It Used to Define Social Networking,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/25/technology/facebook-likeshare-buttons.html.
25
See Georgia Wells, Jeff Horwitz, & Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Knows Instagram Is
Toxic for Teen Girls, Company Documents Show, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 14, 2021), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-knows-instagram-is-toxic-for-teen-girls-company-documentsshow-11631620739?.
26
Mark Zuckerberg, An Open Letter from Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Sep. 8, 2006),
https://www.facebook.com/notes/2832474983634072/.
27
See Jamin Warren & Vauhini Vara, New Facebook Features Have Members in an Uproar, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 7, 2006), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115759058710755893.
28
Jessi Hempel, A Short History of Facebook’s Privacy Gaffes, WIRED (Mar. 30, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-a-history-of-mark-zuckerberg-apologizing/.
29
Zuckerberg, supra note 26.
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you to control the sharing. Our choices are not transparent, and we do
not operate with candor.” Why? Advertising revenue.
Just over a year later, in December of 2007, he apologized again.30
This time, Zuckerberg was responding to the “outrage” that he was taking
user information and simply giving it to advertisers.31 What did he say? “It
took us too long after people started contacting us to change the product so
that users had to explicitly approve what they wanted to share.”32
Translation: “We redesigned things to give you “control,” but instead of
actually giving you control up front, we created a default that was not
transparent and gave us control.” Why? Advertising revenue.
Two years later, in December of 2009, he said that Facebook was going
to “empower people to personalize control over their information.”33 But it
turns out the tools were excessively confusing and actually pushed users to
make information public rather than private.34 Why? Advertising revenue.
The result this time was a Federal Trade Commission investigation.35
In May of 2010, he was forced to apologize again. Advertisers were
using a privacy loophole to retrieve personal information about users.36 This
time, what did Zuckerberg say? “Sometimes we move too fast. . .”37 The
reason for lightspeed product development and loopholes? Advertising
revenue.
In November of 2011, Zuckerberg stated: “I’m the first to admit that
we’ve made a bunch of mistakes.”38 Why? Because the pursuit of advertising revenue resulted in a settlement with the FTC, which had charged the
company with deceiving customers by telling them they could keep their
information private, when in fact the company was sharing it and making it
public.39 He also announced new privacy tools and an additional Chief Privacy Officer.40
The list goes on. In January of 2013, the company was forced to con-front
its prior promises that users controlled who had access to their infor-

30
Jessi Hempel, A Short History of Facebook’s Privacy Gaffes, WIRED (Mar. 30, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-a-history-of-mark-zuckerberg-apologizing/.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Emily Steel & Jessica E. Vascellaro, Facebook, MySpace Confront Privacy Loophole,
WALL ST. J. (May 21, 2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870451
3104575256701215465596.
37
Mark Zuckerberg, From Facebook, answering privacy concerns with new settings,
WASH. POST (May 24, 2010), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/
05/23/AR2010052303828.html.
38
Mark Zuckerberg, Our Commitment to the Facebook Community, META (Nov. 29,
2011), https://about.fb.com/news/2011/11/our-commitment-to-the-facebook-community/.
39
Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived Consumers By Failing To Keep Privacy
Promises, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-failing-keep.
40
Zuckerberg, supra note 38.
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mation.41 Rather than keep this promise, the company instead created a
search mechanism that allowed users to search any information not proactively protected, thus increasing the odds that information would be accessible.42 Again, Facebook’s approach made it difficult for users to protect their
information and lacked candor and transparency. Why? Advertising
revenue.
Importantly, Facebook’s choices, whether about privacy or otherwise,
impact far more than users, including its decisions involving elections in the
United States and other countries. Consider the Cambridge Analytica scandal. According to reports, Facebook allowed Cambridge Analytica and
Strategic Communications Laboratories to take private user data from 87
million Facebook users.43 Cambridge Analytica used that data in its work
with the Trump Campaign, arguably impacting the United States’s 2016
election outcome.44 One board member, Peter Thiel, was connected to the
scandal.45 Facebook knew about the problem; yet, it revealed the breach
only when it was about to become public, referring to a legal agreement
with Cambridge Analytica to delete all of the data.46
Unfortunately, Cambridge Analytica had not followed through with the
agreement. As a result, Facebook harmed its users, but it also harmed stakeholders—here, non-users impacted by the 2016 election. Moreover, in a typical lack of candor and transparency, Facebook owned its choices only when
the issue was about to become public,47 saying, “[t]his is another unacceptable violation of trust.”48 Ironically, however, the violation of trust to which
it was referring was not its violation with its users or its stakeholders. It was
referring to Cambridge Analytica’s violation of trust with Facebook.49
On the user violations, the company said, “we’ve heard loud and clear
that privacy settings and other important tools are too hard to find and that

41

Hempel, supra note 30.
Id.
Issie Lapowsky, Facebook Exposed 87 Million Users to Cambridge Analytica, WIRED
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-exposed-87-million-users-to-cam
bridge-analytica/.
44
Andrea Valdez, Everything You Need to Know About Facebook and Cambridge
Analytica, WIRED (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/wired-facebook-cambridgeanalytica-coverage/.
45
Peter Thiel owns Palantir, a company that is alleged to have had several senior employees working on the Facebook profile data acquired by Cambridge Analytica. See, e.g.,
Nicholas Confessore & Matthew Rosenberg, Peter Thiel employee helped Cambridge
Analytica before it harvested data, CNBC (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/28/
new-york-times-digital-peter-thiel-employee-helped-cambridge-analytica-before-it-harvesteddata.html; Arjun Khaarpal, Palantir worked with Cambridge Analytica on the Facebook data it
acquired, whistleblower alleges, CNBC (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/27/
palantir-worked-with-cambridge-analytica-on-the-facebook-data-whistleblower.html.
46
Valdez, supra note 44.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
42
43

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\12-2\HLB204.txt

408

unknown

Seq: 8

Harvard Business Law Review

20-SEP-22

14:57

[Vol. 12

we must do more to keep people informed.”50 Sound familiar? It should.
Facebook had been saying exactly this for a decade, but it did not make
simple or transparent mechanisms. Why? Advertising revenue.
Sadly, Zuckerberg’s initial response to the Cambridge Analytica mess
apparently was to spend the weekend of the scandal arguing about who was
most to blame. In his view, it was Cambridge Analytica.51 While he was
perseverating and worrying about testifying in front of Congress,
#deletefacebook was trending on Twitter.52 When he finally spoke, he apologized, announced further changes to the platform, and promised to audit
apps that had access to large amounts of information, noting that apps that
would not agree to audits would be banned.53 Perhaps this was a response
to the stakeholder violations, but if so, it certainly lacks candor and
transparency. Moreover, the problem is that this was just one of many
privacy scandals, one of many apologies, and one of many preventable
situations—if only Zuckerberg or Facebook cared about stakeholders and
social license and not just advertising revenue and growth at all costs.
This is the nub of it. Facebook’s revenue model is in tension with both
good corporate governance and privacy protection as well as with publicness
and social license more generally.54 The model is one of selling access to
advertisers and news producers supported by the “religious tenet” that
Facebook is an “open, neutral platform”55 “for all ideas.”56 Neutrality, of
course, means that the company takes no position.57 Taking no position,
however, is not the same as being objective.58 Indeed, neutrality breeds illinformed consumers.59 Objectivity, on the other hand, would mean that the
company addressed or even corrected for prejudice and even falsity.60 Yet,
neither Zuckerberg nor the company seems to take ownership or accept
responsibility for the lack of objectivity.

50

Hempel, supra note 30.
Valdez, supra note 44.
Id.
53
Id.
54
Facebook has held back on fixing problems “for fear of hurting its business.” Jeff Horwitz, Facebook Says Its Rules Apply to All. Company Documents Reveal a Secret Elite That’s
Exempt, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 13, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-files-xcheckzuckerberg-elite-rules-11631541353.
55
Nicholas Thompson & Fred Vogelstein, Inside the Two Years That Shook Facebook—
and the World, WIRED (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/inside-facebook-markzuckerberg-2-years-of-hell.
56
Nick Statt, Zuckerberg calls Facebook ‘a platform for all ideas’ after meeting with
conservatives, VERGE (May 18, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/5/18/11706266/markzuckerberg-facebook-conservative-news-censorship-meeting.
57
Thompson & Vogelstein, supra note 55.
58
Id.
59
Johann N. Neem, Reporters can’t be objective if they remain neutral, SEATTLE TIMES
(Oct. 4, 2007), https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/reporters-cant-be-objective-if-they-remain-neutral.
60
Thompson & Vogelstein, supra note 55.
51
52
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Instead, as the Trump administration assumed office and began populating regulatory agencies, Zuckerberg began to assume more responsibility for
the company’s role in D.C., doubling down on his choices not to act, not to
fact check, and not to take responsibility for the outcomes of choices.61 In
essence, Zuckerberg continues to confuse neutrality with objectivity, stating
that changes, if any, should come through regulation.62 Add to that the tension between privacy and targeted advertising, attracting publishers, driving
user growth, and other aspects of the revenue model, the result is an endless
cycle of harm, apology (fine), repeat—without any real change.
Media accounts of Facebook’s scandals also reveal what are arguably
significant fiduciary gaps in the choices of Zuckerberg and Sheryl Sandberg,
the Chief Operating Officer.63 Although their relationship is now reportedly
strained, they have been partners at the company for 13 years.64 Throughout
that time, Sandberg’s role has been generating revenue from users—regardless of how or why the users were using the site.65 Indeed, more users are
good for revenues even if those users are caught up in conspiracy theories—
and that is a key challenge for the company. It might also explain why
Sandberg, too, appears to operate without candor and transparency.
Consider the media reports of a 2017 board meeting following the
Cambridge Analytica scandal. Apparently, Sandberg invited two corporate
officers involved in the internal review of Russian interference to brief the
board’s audit committee, which was chaired by Erskine Bowles, former
President Emeritus of the University of North Carolina.66 According to the
media, the General Counsel, Colin Stretch, and the Chief Security Officer,
Alex Stamos, knew that the company did not yet understand the depth of
the interference or its role in electing Donald Trump.67 Bowles grilled
the two men, occasionally cursing, on how Facebook had allowed itself to
become a tool for Russian interference. [Stretch and Stamos] were
forthcoming with the Audit Committee on the extent of what they had
found and what might yet be discovered.68 Bowles demanded to know both
why it had taken so long to uncover the activity, and why Facebook
directors were only now being told. That afternoon, in a full board
meeting, Bowles pressed Zuckerberg and Sandberg, “pelt[ing]”
them with questions.69 As reported, Sandberg’s reaction was to complain,
stating that Stretch and Stamos, by being candid, “had thrown [Zuckerberg
and61
Sheera Frenkel & Cecilia Kang, Mark Zuckerberg and Sheryl Sandberg’s Partnership
Did Not Survive Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/08/
business/mark-zuckerberg-sheryl-sandberg-facebook.html.
62
Id.
63
Sheera Frenkel et al., Delay, Deny and Deflect: How Facebook’s Leaders Fought
Through Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/technology/facebook-data-russia-election-racism.html.
64
Frenkel & Kang, supra note 61.
65
Id.
66
Frenkel et al., supra note 63.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
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Sandberg] under the bus.”70,71 They were, however, actually fulfilling
their own fiduciary obligations—something neither Sandberg nor
Zuckerberg appear to understand.72 Now, Stretch and Stamos have left the
company, exiting in 2018. Stamos’s departure was reportedly over the
company’s choices around the handling of the election fallout.73 Bowles
resigned from the board as well.
Consider next the FTC investigations of the company and
how Facebook has enacted its settlements with the agency. After the 2016
elections and the revelations about the privacy violations, the FTC
commenced an investigation into the company’s practices, arguing that it
had violated a 2012 Settlement/Consent Decree.74 Facebook settled with
the FTC in 2019, resulting in another consent decree (the 2019 Settlement/
Consent Decree). Notably, both Democratic members of the FTC
dissented from the 2019 FTC Settlement,75 arguing, in part, that the
provisions were insufficient and vague and that real change required changes
to governance at the top.76
It appears that they were right. In August of 2021, Facebook aggravated
the FTC by pushing two researchers from NYU’s Ad Observatory off of the
platform,77 insinuating that the terms of the 2019 FTC Settlement required it
to do so.78 The researchers were searching Facebook’s Ad Library to understand the social and political effects of ads, focusing on vaccine hesitancy
and the January 6 Capitol attack.79 The researchers had also found that politi70

Id.
In reality, Sandberg was likely violating her own fiduciary duties as a director and as an
officer. See, e.g., OptimisCorp v. Waite, 2015 WL 5147038, at *72 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 2015),
aff’d, 137 A.3d 970 (Del. 2016) (holding that directors who were aware of a key issue
breached their duty of candor by not alerting their fellow directors.); Gantler v. Stephens, 965
A.2d 695 (Del. 2009) (Delaware officers owe the same duties to the corporation as directors).
72
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“Where directors fail to act in the face
of a known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities,
they breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good
faith.”).
73
Devin Coldewey, Facebook loses its chief security officer Alex Stamos, TECH CRUNCH
(Aug. 1, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/08/01/facebook-loses-its-chief-security-officeralex-stamos/. It appears that Bowles understood what the officers did not: the outcome of this
information was not going to be good and his role as a director was to press the officers to get
it right and for candor. See infra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
74
FTC’s $5 billion Facebook settlement: Record-breaking and history-making, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, (July 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2019/
07/ftcs-5-billion-facebook-settlement-record-breaking-history.
75
Id.
76
In re Facebook, F.T.C. No. 1823109 (2019) (Chopra, Comm’r, dissenting).
77
Jeff Horwitz, Facebook Seeks Shutdown of NYU Research Project Into Political Ad
Targeting, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-seeks-shutdown-of-nyu-research-project-into-political-ad-targeting-11603488533.
78
Lois Anne DeLong, Facebook Disables Ad Observatory; Academicians and Journalists
Fire Back, NYU CTR. FOR CYBER SEC. (Aug. 21, 2021), https://cyber.nyu.edu/2021/08/21/
facebook-disables-ad-observatory-academicians-and-journalists-fire-back/.
79
Sue Halpern, Why Facebook Is Suddenly Afraid of the F.T.C., THE NEW YORKER (Aug.
23, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/why-facebook-is-suddenlyafraid-of-the-ftc.
71
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cal ads were not labeled with information about who was paying—despite
Facebook’s public disclosures to the contrary.80
In response to Facebook’s insinuations that the 2019 FTC Settlement
required it to oust the researchers from the platform, the FTC’s acting Director of Consumer Protection pushed back, stating,
I am disappointed by how your company has conducted itself
in this matter. Only last week, Facebook’s General Counsel, Jennifer Newstead, committed the company to “timely, transparent
communication to BCP staff about significant developments.” Yet
the FTC received no notice that Facebook would be publicly invoking our consent decree to justify terminating academic research
earlier this week.
Had you honored your commitment to contact us in advance,
we would have pointed out that the consent decree does not bar
Facebook from creating exceptions for good-faith research in the
public interest. Indeed, the FTC supports efforts to shed light on
opaque business practices, especially around surveillance-based
advertising. While it is not our role to resolve individual disputes
between Facebook and third parties, we hope that the company is
not invoking privacy—much less the FTC consent order—as a
pretext to advance other aims.81
Seen in their best light, Facebook’s insinuations are cynical. However,
they are arguably far worse. They appear to indicate outright disregard for
the law, here the 2019 FTC Settlement/Consent Decree, as well as flagrant
disregard for the company’s stakeholders. That disregard has real and significant consequences—like the company’s impact on the 2016 elections. Notably, harm in that context extends well beyond privacy concerns and harm to
stakeholders and users. It extends to US citizens more generally. The same is
true for any role the company may have played in the coordination and
facilitation of the January 6 assault on the US Capitol.82 And for what it
appears to have done to teenage girls. And for the role it seems to play in
human trafficking. And for elections outside the US and human rights
violations worldwide. Indeed, the list is long. Disregard for the company’s
users, clients, and for the public generally, is part of the fabric of the
company and its revenue model. Moreover, it flourishes as a result of a
lack of candor, transparency, and internal controls.
80
Craig Silverman & Ryan Mac, Facebook Promised To Label Political Ads, But Ads for
Biden, The Daily Wire, And Interest Groups Are Slipping Through, BUZZFEED (OCT. 22, 2020),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/facebook-biden-election-ads
81
Samuel Levine, Letter from Acting Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection Samuel Levine to Facebook, FED. TRADE COMM’N. (Aug. 5, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/consumer-blog/2021/08/letter-acting-director-bureau-consumer-protection-samuel. Facebook is also facing a 2020 antitrust complaint from the FTC.
82
See Craig Timberg et al., Inside Facebook, Jan. 6 violence fueled anger, regret over
missed warning signs, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/10/22/jan-6-capitol-riot-facebook/.
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INTERNAL CONTROLS

These issues—concerns about targeted advertising, neutrality, objectivity, and stakeholder harm—are all actually questions about the corporate
strategy. Strategy is in the domain of the board of directors and is to be set
by management in consultation with the board. Indeed, this is one of the
board’s core responsibilities (the other two being risk and people (including
Zuckerberg)).83 Strategy is tied to culture, which is set through tone from
the top.84 Healthy corporate governance and the friction it provides in the
cor-porate boardroom also connect to culture. But at Facebook,
governance is complicated by Zuckerberg himself. He is a controlling
shareholder who, according to news reports and filings, tolerates little
dissent or pushback from the board.85 The result is a lack of the
innovative friction, let alone internal controls, that a healthy and engaged
board can provide.86
Friction occurs both through discussion and through the actual internal
control mechanisms imposed by corporate law. Directors, like officers, have
fiduciary responsibilities to the company. All corporate directors are required to engage in monitoring and provide oversight.87 This fiduciary duty
is actu-ally part of the duty of loyalty and generally referred to as the
good-faith obligation.88 The duty also includes conflicts of interest and
corporate opportunities.89
The array of fiduciary obligations for directors also includes the duties
of care and candor.90 The duty of care requires that directors engage in good

83
Corporate Governance Guidelines, FACEBOOK (Dec. 3, 2020), https://investor.fb.com/
leadership-and-governance/corporate-governance-guidelines/default.aspx
84
See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL, 184 (2014); Donald C. Langevoort &
Hillary A. Sale, Corporate Adolescence: Why Did “We” Not Work?, TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1378
(2021).
85
See Jeff Horwitz & Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Nears Complete Board Overhaul
With Latest Exit, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-namesformer-deputy-secretary-of-the-treasury-to-its-board-11585256495.
86
Langevoort & Sale, supra note 84; Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013, 2015–16 (2013).
87
Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 824 (Del. 2019) (“If Caremark means anything, it
is that a corporate board must make a good faith effort to exercise its duty of care.”); see
Pollman, supra note 86 at 2023 (“And a decade later, in 2006, a pair of cases came before the
Delaware Supreme Court that affirmed the validity of a Caremark claim, gave meaning to the
fiduciary duty of good faith and cabined it within the fiduciary duty of loyalty.. . .”).
88
See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362.
89
See, e.g., Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1061–62 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff’d,
872 A.2d 559 (Del. 2005), judgment entered, (Del. Ch. 2004), aff’d, 872 A.2d 559 (Del. 2005);
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510–11 (Del. 1939); Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d
148, 155 (Del. 1996).
90
Peter A. Atkins, Marc S. Gerber, & Edward B. Micheletti, Directors’ Fiduciary Duties:
Back to Delaware Law Basics, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/10/directors-fiduciary-duties-back-to-delaware-lawbasics/
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processes, which this board repeatedly fails to do, and ensure that they have
sufficient information before making decisions.91
Candor, however, is embedded in every duty.92 Indeed, good faith actions and discourse built on transparent processes backed by candor can help
to produce the kind of culture that avoids the cycle of problems described in
this article. Thus, candor plays a powerful role in ensuring fiduciary behavior. It is part of the information-forcing substance theory that is tied to disclosure discourse.93 Good candor ensures informed decision making.94
Information, in turn, impacts substantive outcomes. It can, for example, affirm a decision.95 It can also result in a different choice.96 Candor in the
decision-making process helps to ensure that directors are fulfilling their
role: engagement with management over strategy and risks.97 The case study
reveals, however, that Sandberg and Zuckerberg, as well as some board
members, appear to lack candor in their dealings with the board-at-large.
These choices, in combination with the sustained cycle of apparent legal and
disclosure violations, indicate systemic issues that require intervention and
the friction and engagement that external monitors can provide.
In essence, good governance requires an active and engaged board that
values and uses candor in its dealings. One that asks questions and questions

91
See Hillary A. Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal Risk
Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 66 DUKE L.J. 763, 788 (2016) (discussing information-forcing-substance theory and candid discourse amongst board members); In re Zale Corp.,
2015 WL 5853693, *19 n.106 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2015) (“Delaware law instructs that the core
inquiry [under the duty of care] is whether there was a real effort to be informed and exercise
judgment.”) (citing In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996)),
op. amended on rearg., 2015 WL 6551418 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2015). McMullin v. Beran, 765
A.2d 910, 921 (Del. 2000) (“The bar for liability ‘is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.’”) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)); see generally Hillary A.
Sale, Disclosure’s Purpose, 107 GEO. L.J. 1050 (2019).
92
As discussed above, candor is embedded in the duty of care; however, candor is also
involved in the duty of loyalty and requires disclosure of material facts relating to interest or
conflicts or the need to be in good faith. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1086 (Del.
2001) (holding the duty of disclosure to be “the application in a specific context of the board’s
fiduciary duties of care, good faith, and loyalty.”); see also OptimisCorp v. Waite 2015 WL
5147038, at *72 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 2015), aff’d, 137 A.3d 970 (Del. 2016) (discussing director
duty of candor).
93
See Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor
and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1204 (2003) (theorizing that federally required
disclosures inherently require candid discourse amongst board members); see Sale &
Langevoort, supra note 92 (discussing the necessity for candid dialogue between directors to
“ensure accurate and complete disclosures.”)
94
Directors may also have a duty to disclose to fellow directors. See, e.g., HMG/Courtland Props., Inc. v. Gray, 749 A.2d 94, 119 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating directors “had an ‘unremitting obligation’ to deal candidly with their fellow directors”) (quoting Mills Acquisition
Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A2d 1261 (Del. 1989)).
95
See also Sale & Langevoort, supra note 91 at 30.
96
Id.
97
This is creative friction in action. Hillary A. Sale, Chapter X: In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN CORPORATE LAW UPDATE 35–45, (on
file with author).
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answers.98 Indeed, the failure to engage is a breach of the fiduciary duty of
loyalty.99 And the failure to ask questions can result in the loss of the protections of the business judgment rule.100 Although litigation in this space is
notoriously difficult for plaintiffs to win, judicial opinions, even if largely at
the motion to dismiss stage, play an important role in setting tone and guideposts for directors seeking to act with independence and to better understand
their role.
Nevertheless, it appears that some directors at Facebook failed to act
independently, and those that tried are no longer on the board. Indeed, in the
space of just one year, four independent directors left the board, reportedly
after “clashing” with Zuckerberg on the platform’s discourse issues.101 The
departing directors included former President Emeritus of the University of
North Carolina, Erskine Bowles, Netflix CEO, Reed Hastings, Facebook’s
Lead Director and then CEO of the Gates Foundation, Susan DesmondHellmann, and former CEO of American Express, Kenneth Chennault.102
Notably, although the departures of Bowles and Hastings were announced at the same time, the other two resignations happened very closely
thereafter, resulting in what the media reported as “serious departures”103
and “a shake up.”104 In the case of Hastings, media reports focused on his
clashes with fellow board member Thiel’s support for Donald Trump and
Cambridge Analytica.105 It appears that for Bowles, the issue was the company’s handling of the Russian interference in the election.106 Kenneth Chenault managed to stick it out for longer, but he, too, reportedly resigned as a
result of governance disagreements and policies.107 His departure followed
Desmond-Hellman’s.108

98
See Langevoort & Sale, supra note 84; see also Hillary A. Sale & Donald C.
Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal Risk Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 66
DUKE L.J. 763, 788 (2016); Sale, supra note 91.
99
Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 729–30
(2007).
100
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 863 (Del. 1985). See also Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (noting that the business judgment rule presumes that directors
“acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
the best interests of the company”).
101
Taylor Hatmaker, Facebook taps Peggy Alford for its board, Reed Hastings and Erskine Bowles to depart, WIRED (Apr. 12, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/04/12/facebookboard-peggy-alford-reed-hastings-erskine-bowles; Horwitz & Seetharaman, supra note 86.
102
Id.
103
Hatmaker, supra note 101.
104
Horowitz & Seetharaman, supra note 85.
105
John Lynch, Netflix’s CEO reportedly offered to resign from Facebook’s board after
slamming Peter Thiel’s support of Trump — but Mark Zuckerberg said ‘no’, BUS. INSIDER
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/netflix-reed-hastings-offered-to-resignfacebook-board-over-peter-thiel-disagreement-2018-2.
106
Frenkel et al., supra note 63.
107
Jeff Horwitz & Deepa Seetharaman, Chenault Leaves Facebook Board After Disagreements With Zuckerberg, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2020) https://www.wsj.com/articles/chenaultleaves-facebook-board-after-disagreements-with-zuckerberg-11584140731?.
108
Horwitz & Seetharaman, supra note 85.
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According to the media, the replacement directors are all people “who
have preexisting social or business relationships with Mr. Zuckerberg.”109
Although these types of connections are not disqualifying for board member
independence, for this board and its lack of internal controls, those ties are
worth questioning. As of today, the board has nine directors, including
Zuckerberg and Sandberg. Two original, “independent” directors, Peter
Thiel and Marc Andreessen, remain. One new director joined in 2019 and
the other four in 2020—significant turnover and a very new board.110
Importantly, when the four independent directors left the board, they
left behind directors who legal and media documents indicate were unlikely
to engage effectively. Effective engagement from the board perspective
means that directors provide a healthy check on the agency problems and
opportunities in the company. Director fiduciary duties are designed to create an environment in which internal controls operate to ensure that the company’s strategy and culture are aligned—as well as that the company is
engaged in lawful conduct and healthy risk management. Good governance
supports those goals as well as helping the company to develop its social
license and cope with publicness (the interplay between internal
governance and public perception).
Consider, for example, the fact that Facebook faces repeated privacy
issues, promises change, and fails to deliver. Is that a breach of a fiduciary
duty on the part of Zuckerberg? It might be, and it might also be a violation
of the securities laws.111 Recall that Sandberg was reportedly angry with
Stretch and Stamos for sharing information with the audit committee about
the Russian election interference. One possible implication is that
Sandberg and Zuckerberg were withholding material information from the
board. If true, that would be a breach of their duty of candor.112
As discussed above, the duty of candor is key to good governance, and
its premise is that management and directors owe each other material information necessary to perform their duties.113 In fact, without candor, it is difficult to see how directors can fulfill their fiduciary duties. By definition,
outside directors are not supposed to be fully engaged in the company. In the
context of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, however, the directors needed
information about the extent and nature of the Russian interference so that
they could assess the risk it might pose to the company. Arguably, they
109

Horwitz & Seetharaman, supra note 107.
It takes most directors six months to a year to get up to speed and make an impact. See,
e.g., Rusty O’Kelley III & Susanne Suhonen, Enhancing Director Performance and Impact,
HARV. L. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jul. 25, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/07/25/
enhancing-director-performance-and-impact; Mark Byford, Michael D. Watkins, & Lena Triantogiannis, Onboarding Isn’t Enough, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/05/
onboarding-isnt-enough.
111
It may well be a violation of the securities laws.
112
See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of
Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187 (2003).
113
Pfeffer v. Redstone, 965 A.2d 676, 684 (Del. 2009) (stating that the “duty of disclosure
is not an independent duty, but derives from the duties of care and loyalty” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
110
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should not have had to ask, but once they did, they deserved fulsome and
complete answers. Directors need this information to fulfill their own monitoring obligations.114 Apparently, Stretch and Stamos provided it, but Zuckerberg and Sandberg did not.
As we know, Zuckerberg’s approach to the “truth” is less than fulsome.
Recall his repeated statements to the public about “equal footing” for all
users.115 Now contrast it with the company’s whitelisting practice.116 Add to
that the statements to Congress, seemingly denying the existence of whitelisting.117 Or his assurances on the impact of Facebook on teenage girls.
These are just two examples of how the leader of the company
appears to treat disclosures. The result is an organization where
transparency and candor do not exist at the top or further down.
To ensure that this environment flourishes, there are laws and regulations designed to establish independence on the part of a majority of the
board and to protect against conflicts of interest. Independence is about
mindset, i.e., directors should not be beholden to or captured by others, and
here in particular, by Zuckerberg. Disinterest is usually defined with reference to conflicts of interest, and, here, Facebook also failed to meet the
standard.
A key conflict of interest at Facebook occurred when Zuckerberg
wanted to sell stock to fund his foundation, but he wanted to do so without
impacting his controlling position at Facebook.118 He requested that the
board reclassify stock to protect him.119 This was a conflicting interest transaction.120 Zuckerberg was on both sides.121

114

See generally Langevoort, supra note 112.
Jeff Horwitz, Facebook Says Its Rules Apply to All. Company Documents Reveal a
Secret Elite That’s Exempt., WALL ST. J. (Sep. 13, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
facebook-files-xcheck-zuckerberg-elite-rules-11631541353.
116
Id.
117
Elizabeth Dwoskin, Craig Timberg, & Tony Romm, Facebook allegedly offered advertisers special access to users’ data and activities, according to documents released by British
lawmakers, WASH. POST. (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/
12/05/facebook-allegedly-offered-advertisers-special-access-users-data-activities-accordingdocuments-released-by-british-lawmakers.
118
Jessica Guynn, Facebook proposes new shares to keep Zuckerberg control, USA TODAY (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/04/27/facebook-markzuckerberg-class-c-nonvoting-stock-proposal/83612842/.
119
Michelle Castillo, Facebook cancels plans to change ownership share structure,
CNBC (Sep. 22, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/22/facebook-cancelled-plan-tochange-ownership-structure.html.
120
See Del. Code. Ann. Tit. 8 § 144 (2019); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del.
1939) (“The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands
that there be no conflict between duty and self-interest.”); Personal Touch Holding Corp. v.
Glaubach, No. CV 11199-CB, 2019 WL 937180, at *19 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 2019) (“[I]n a
typical self-dealing transaction, the fiduciary is the recipient of an allegedly improper personal
benefit, which usually comes in the form of obtaining something of value or eliminating a
liability.”).
121
See Del. Code. Ann. Tit. 8 § 144 (2019); Valeant Pharms. Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732,
745 (Del. Ch. 2007) (conflict of interest transactions that are approved by a committee of
115
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Conflicts of interest occur for fiduciaries. Indeed, they are not forbidden.122 Instead, fiduciaries are expected to operate with clean hands and engage in cleansing—full information, transparency, recusal, independent
approvals, and outside advisors.123 This is standard operating procedure, but
not at Facebook. Instead, like so many things at Facebook, the process surrounding this transaction was far from clean.
Apparently, the board established an “independent” Special Committee
to review and advise on Zuckerberg’s proposal: that he sell stock to fund his
philanthropic goals, but that the board issue non-voting stock to existing
shareholders to ensure that he did not lose his controlling position.124 The
board appointed a Special Committee, composed of Andreessen, DesmondHellman, and Bowles to evaluate the proposal.125
Appointing a special and independent committee is the right choice in a
circumstance like this, but appointing one that operated like Facebook’s is
not. There are multiple governance issues surrounding the Special Committee. Apparently, it was required to develop a charter, which should have
included responsibilities and duties.126 It did not do so.127 It did hire financial and legal advisers, but without meeting them first.128 The result was a
lead banker that stated it was hired after the transaction was under way, and
a financial advisor that had been Zuckerberg’s own personal advisor on the
same transaction.129 The former is sloppy governance at best; the latter is a
classic no-no.130

disinterested directors are subject to review under the business judgment standard rather than
entire fairness standard).
122
Del. Code Ann. Tit.8, § 144 (2019); Valeant Pharms., 921 A.2d at 745.
123
To determine whether an interested-director transaction satisfies Section 144(a) there
must be disinterested directors acting in good faith who were aware of the material facts relating to the conflict and the transaction. Del. Code. Ann. Tit. 8 § 144(a)(1) (2019); Kahn v M&F
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 645, 645 (Del. 2014).
124
Dan Levine, Facebook Hit with Lawsuit Over Plan to Issue New Stock, REUTERS (Apr.
29, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-stocks-lawsuit/facebook-hit-with-lawsuit-over-plan-to-issue-new-stock-idUSKCN0XQ2LM.
125
Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Potential Hitch in Zuckerberg’s Stock Plan for Facebook,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/business/dealbook/a-potential-hitch-in-zuckerbergs-stock-plan-for-facebook.html.
126
Second Verified Amended Complaint at 309, In re Facebook, Inc. Derivative Litig.,
No. 2018-0307) 2021 WL 4552158 (Del. Ch. Oct. 5, 2021).
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
The mere existence of a special committee is not enough to cleanse a transaction.
Rabkin v. Olin Corp., C.A. No. 7547, 1990 WL 47648, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1990), aff’d,
586 A.2d 1202 (Del. 1990). Instead, a court will examine special approval to ensure that the
majority shareholder did not dictate the transaction’s terms and the committee had real bargaining power. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1120 (Del. 1994). A special committee can be rendered ineffective because of “subtle influences, such as a network of
relationships with the controller which, in aggregate, raises doubt.” Frederick Hsu Living Tr.
v. Oak Hill Capital Partners III, L.P., C.A. No. 12108-VCL, slip op. at 34 (Del. Ch. May 4,
2020).
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According to court documents, the Special Committee asked Zuckerberg for concessions.131 Zuckerberg rejected them.132 So, the Special
Committee appears to have rolled over, with Desmond-Hellman testifying
that “the committee believed that it had no real ability to say ‘no’ to Zuckerberg.”133 The shareholders, however, disagreed. Although there were 5.1
billion votes in favor of the transaction, the vast majority of those votes were
Zuckerberg’s.134 Without his votes, there were only 453 million votes in
favor with 1.5 billion votes against.135
Then there is Marc Andreessen and his role on the Special Committee.
According to the court documents, throughout the process, Andreessen was
in constant contact with Zuckerberg—despite the fact that the Special Committee was supposed to be independent.136 His texts were filled with smiley
faces and assurances that Andreessen was working to get Zuckerberg what
Zuckerberg wanted.137 In the words of the plaintiffs’ complaint, Andreessen
was a “mole” for Zuckerberg.138 And, when the vote of the Special Committee took place, Zuckerberg and Thiel were both present even though good
governance would indicate that only committee members should have
been.139

131
Second Verified Amended Complaint at 310, In re Facebook, Inc. Derivative Litig.,
No. 2018-0307, 2021 WL 4552158 (Del. Ch. Oct. 5, 2021).
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
For a special committee to be valid, it must conduct a process where the majority
shareholder does not dictate the terms of the transaction and the special committee has real
bargaining power that it exercises with the majority shareholder on an arm’s-length basis. Kahn
v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1120 (Del. 1994). The evidence of Andreessen and
Zuckerburg’s communications thus invalidate the ability of the special committee to act
independently.
137
Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook’s Plan to Keep Zuckerberg in Control Was Flawed,
Lawsuit Says, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebooks-plan-tokeep-zuckerberg-in-control-was-flawed-lawsuit-says-1481314730.
138
Second Verified Amended Complaint at 310, In re Facebook, Inc. Derivative Litig.,
No. 2018-0307, 2021 WL 4552158 (Del. Ch. Oct. 5, 2021.
139
In Re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. Derivative Litig., No. CV 2018-0058-JTL, 2019 WL
1224556, at *15 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 2019) (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
710–11 (Del. 1983) (“[d]irector[s] can avoid liability for an interested transaction by totally
abstaining from any participation in the transaction.”). Delaware courts have expressed increased skepticism over transactions involving conflicted controllers. See, e.g., Kahn, 638
A.2d at 1117 (holding that a special committee must have the ability to say no to any proposed
transaction without fear of retaliation); Tornetta v. Musk, 250 A.3d 793, 800 (Del. Ch. 2019)
(stating that there is “an obvious fear that even putatively independent directors may owe or
feel a more-than-wholesome allegiance to the interests of the controller, rather than to the
corporation and its public stockholders”); In re Pure Resources, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 808
A.2d 421, 436 (Del. Ch. 2002) (describing the controlling shareholder as an 800-pound gorilla
to whom independent directors are unlikely to stand up to due to loyalties or fear of retribution). Accordingly, Zuckerberg’s presence in the room with the special committee makes it
even more unlikely that the independent directors would feel able to say no to him. For that
reason, he should have recused himself. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N CORP. LAWS COMM., CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 22–23 (7th ed. 2020).
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In its review, the Chancery Court noted that Andreessen was likely
lacking in independence.140 Moreover, the court also noted that the way he
shared information with Zuckerberg infected what was supposed to be a conflict cleansing process.141 The court also noted, without so ruling, that a
second committee member, Desmond-Hellman, was likely not independent.142 Unfortunately, this was the committee that the board selected to
cleanse the transaction, leaving the board’s ability to act in an objective fashion open to question.
The real issues at Facebook, however, are those of publicness and governance, which impact each other. Publicness is the “interplay between the
inside corporate governance players, like the officers and the board, and
outside actors who report on, reframe, and impact information about the
company as well as its public perception.”143 All companies, whether publicly held or not, are subject to publicness and its impact on governance
choices.144 They are all also both social and economic actors, and the two
cannot be separated.145 This is the concept of social license, or that businesses exist with permission from the communities and stakeholders impacted by them.146 This is a lesson that Uber, while still privately held,
learned painfully and publicly and for which its founder was ousted.147 It is,
however, a lesson that Zuckerberg and Facebook have yet to learn and for
which the stakeholders are paying.

140
The Delaware Supreme Court referred to the back-channel communications as
“facially dubious.” United Food & Com. Workers Union v. Zuckerberg, 262 A.3d 1034, 1044
(Del. 2021).
141
United Food & Com. Workers Union v. Zuckerberg, 250 A.3d 862, 893 (Del. Ch.
2020).
142
Id. at 900.
143
Hillary A. Sale, The Corporate Purpose of Social License, 94 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 785
(2021); see also Hillary A. Sale, J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy of Corporate Publicness, 79
BROOK. L. REV. 1629, 1630 (2014); Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1012, 1013-14 (2013); Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 L. & CONTEMPORARY PROBS. 137, 141 (2011); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L. J. 337, 340
(2013); Onnig H. Dombalagian, Principles for Publicness, 67 FLA. L. REV. 649, 653–55
(2015).
144
See generally Sale, The Corporate Purpose of Social License, supra note 143, at
769–818 (discussing the scandals of Wells Fargo and Uber).
145
Id. at 789; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 933, 962–64 (2017).
146
Sale, The Corporate Purpose of Social License, supra note 143 at 789; see also
Domene Mele & Jaume Armengou, Moral Legitimacy in Controversial Projects and its Relationship with Social License to Operate: A Case Study, 136 J. BUS. ETHICS 729 (2016); Jeffrey
Bone, Legal Perspective on Corporate Responsibility: Contractarian or Communitarian
Thought, 24 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 277, 288 (2011) (stating that corporations possess social
contracts with their constituent and societal shareholders).
147
Sale, The Corporate Purpose of Social License, supra note 143 at 795, 811–13 (Uber’s
desire to launch an IPO and show its willingness to change required it to make the Holder
Report public. This report included recommendations to change the culture and accountability
of the company including diminishing CEO Kalanick’s role and calling for enhanced board
oversight with an independent committee).
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Facebook’s impact extends well beyond its users, for example to the
victims of election fraud, to the victims of human trafficking, to its employees, and, of course, to its shareholders, among others. As this case study
reveals, Zuckerberg appears to value revenues, growth, and control over all
else, and that is at the core of the challenge. Facebook’s revenue model is
one of behavioral advertising,148 mining users for personal information it
can sell to enable targeted ads.149 Without that approach, Facebook’s growth
might have been slower. Either way, the revenue model is core to the
strategy, at the root of the harm, and, therefore, core to the board’s role.150
Yet, to date, the board has proven itself ineffective in this area and,
arguably, those who tried exited in 2019 and 2020.
In short, Facebook has proved that it cannot effectively manage or control its reach. Its officers have proved, time and again, that they either cannot
or will not engage with candor or monitor themselves. This lack of transparency extends to their relations with the board of directors. The members
of the board, in turn, have also arguably failed to impose limits on Zuckerberg or manage the concerns effectively. Regardless of whether they believed themselves incapable of exercising effective challenge or setting
limits (as Desmond-Hellman testified), or they simply ignored the limits
(Andreessen), or they resigned in frustration, the outcome is the same. The
internal control mechanisms that are inherent in an effective and engaged
board appear to be simply missing.
Those mechanisms, however, are designed to produce the friction that
results in decision making rooted in a healthy process at the board level.
They are also designed to ensure candor and transparency: that the board is
consulted and allowed to question strategic choices and has a role in setting
the culture. Instead, at Facebook, the culture appears to be toxic. And,
as the recent documents and August 2021 letter from the FTC indicate, the
current board is seemingly not up to fulfilling the fiduciary duties that are
part of the internal controls scheme built into corporate law. The result is
likely to be repeated compliance issues, repeated privacy violations,
repeated settlements and apologies, and ongoing harm to stakeholders and
users.
Indeed, the repeated “disclosures” and “apologies” on privacy are
striking when viewed together. Here is the timeline:
• 2003, Facemash misuses student information,
° Zuckerberg says, “Issues about violating people’s privacy don’t
seem to be surmountable,” “I’m not willing to risk insulting
anyone.”151
148
FACEBOOK, INC., 2020 Annual Report 15 (2021), https://investor.fb.com/financials/
default.aspx.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 17.
151
Katharine A. Kaplan, Facemash Creator Survives Ad Board, THE HARV. CRIMSON
(Nov. 19, 2003), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2003/11/19/facemash-creator-survivesad-board-the.
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• 2006, Newsfeed design reveals user information,152
° Zuckerberg says, “We did a bad job of explaining . . . the new
features . . . and an even worse job of giving [users] control of
them.”153
• 2007, Facebook is caught sharing information with advertisers,154
° Zuckerberg says, “we released a new feature called Beacon to try
to help people share information with their friends about things
they do on the web. We’ve made a lot of mistakes building this
feature, but we’ve made even more with how we’ve handled
them.”155
• 2009, the FTC launches an investigation into Facebook for its unfair
and deceptive privacy promises.156
• 2010, Facebook’s privacy loophole is revealed,157
° Zuckerberg says, “Sometimes we move too fast—and after listening to recent concerns, we’re responding.”158
• 2011, Facebook settles with the FTC over claims about deceptive
privacy statements.159
° Zuckerberg says, “I’m the first to admit that we’ve made a bunch
of mistakes.”160
• 2013, Facebook admits that a system bug exposed 6 million users’
phone numbers and email addresses to unauthorized viewers over
the year.161
° Facebook says the problem is, “something we’re upset and embarrassed by. . . .”162

152
Jamin Warren & Vauhini Vara, New Facebook Features Have Members in an Uproar,
WALL ST. J. (Sep. 7, 2006), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115759058710755893.
153
Zuckerberg, supra note 26.
154
Caroline McCarthy, MoveOn to Facebook: We caught you red-handed, CNET (Nov.
26, 2007), https://www.cnet.com/news/moveon-to-facebook-we-caught-you-red-handed.
155
Mark Zuckerberg, Thoughts on Beacon, FACEBOOK (Dec. 6, 2007), https://
about.fb.com/news/2007/12/announcement-facebook-users-can-now-opt-out-of-beaconfeature.
156
Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived Consumers By Failing To Keep Privacy Promises, FED. TRADE COMM’N. (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-failing-keep; Complaint,
In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., https://epic.org/wp-content/uploads/privacy/inrefacebook/
EPIC-FacebookComplaint.pdf.
157
Emily Steel & Jessica E. Vascellaro, Facebook, MySpace Confront Privacy Loophole,
WALL ST. J. (May 21, 2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870451310457
5256701215465596.
158
Mark Zuckerberg, From Facebook, answering privacy concerns with new settings,
WASH. POST (May 24, 2010), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/
05/23/AR2010052303828.html.
159
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 156.
160
Zuckerberg, supra note 38.
161
Gerry Shih, Facebook admits year-long data breach exposed 6 million users, REUTERS
(June 21, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/net-us-facebook-security/facebook-admitsyear-long-data-breach-exposed-6-million-users-idUSBRE95K18Y20130621.
162
Id.
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• 2018, Facebook’s use of the firm, “Definers Public Affairs,” for attack research on competitors and members of Congress becomes
public,163
° Zuckerberg says, “I understand that a lot of D.C.-type firms
might do this kind of work. When I learned about it I decided that
we don’t want to be doing it.”164
• 2018, Cambridge Analytica misuses user information,165
° Zuckerberg says, “it’s a breach of trust, and I am sorry.”166
• 2019, Facebook enters into a settlement/consent decree with the FTC.
° Zuckerberg apologizes.
• 2021, Facebook is chastised by the FTC for breaching the 2019 Settlement/Consent Decree.
• 2021, Zuckerberg tells Congress that platforms are not harmful to
children despite internal evidence on human trafficking, domestic
servitude, and body image issues,167
° Zuckerberg stops apologizing.168
The Cambridge Analytica scandal is perhaps the most powerful of all, because the statement from Zuckerberg following it was, “We have a responsibility to protect your data, and if we can’t then we don’t deserve to serve
you.”169
This article contends that it appears Facebook does not deserve to
serve users or harm stakeholders anymore—at least not on its own.
Instead, as the case study in Part I and the governance discussion above
reveal, Facebook’s internal governance mechanisms seem to be broken and
it may now need external governance mechanisms to get back on track,
provide friction in its processes, and allow the board to govern effectively.

163
Mike Isaac & Jack Nicas, Facebook Cuts Ties With Washington Firm That Sought to
Discredit Social Network’s Critics, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/11/15/technology/facebook-definers-soros.html.
164
Jack Nicas & Matthew Rosenberg, A Look Inside the Tactics of Definers, Facebook’s
Attack Dog, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/technology/
facebook-definers-opposition-research.html.
165
Alvin Chang, The Facebook and Cambridge Analytica scandal, explained with a simple diagram, VOX (May 2, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/23/
17151916/facebook-cambridge-analytica-trump-diagram.
166
Facebook Boss Apologises in UK and US newspaper ads, BBC NEWS (Mar. 25, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43532948.
167
See Lauren Feiner, Lawmakers demand answers from Zuckerberg after investigation
finds Instagram is toxic for teen girls, CNBC (Sep. 15, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/
15/lawmakers-demand-facebook-answer-how-it-impacts-kids-mental-health.html; Mark Zuckerberg, I Wanted to Share a Note, FACEBOOK (Oct. 5, 2021), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/
posts/10113961365418581.
168
Id.
169
Jessi Hempel, A Short History of Facebook’s Privacy Gaffes, WIRED (Mar. 30, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-a-history-of-mark-zuckerberg-apologizing/.
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EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE

Although the use of monitors is more common in government settlements,170 judges in private litigation have approved their use. A powerful and
recent example occurred in the Fox News derivative litigation of fiduciary
duty breaches.171 This litigation arose out of the sexual harassment and other
allegations against Roger Ailes and others at the company. The litigation
was settled for 90 million dollars and with non-monetary relief that resulted
in the creation of a Professionalism and Inclusion Council—outside
monitors who engage with company leaders to provide information, and arguably, friction, to address the systemic issues underlying the litigation.
The Council is structured to provide that friction through access to the
board and information and through some of the hallmarks of independent
governance and controls. For example, it reports directly to the Company’s
Nominating and Governance Committee and semi-annual public reports are
required.172 As established, it was to be composed of six members, one from
human resources at Twenty-First Century Fox and one from Fox News Channel, and the other four appointed and independent.173 Notably, all four independent appointees required approval by the Plaintiff.174 The settlement
document further stipulated that two of the nominees had to have relevant
expertise and the other two had to be “of respected stature with relevant
experience in the media industry.”175
There are multiple other stipulations designed to ensure strong members, access to information, and a process with integrity.176 Council members are paid at a fair and reasonable rate, and five senior staff members at
Fox News help with its work.177 The Council has full authority and responsibility, the power to convene in executive sessions, and must meet four times
per year on its own, two times per year with the chair of the nominating and
governance committee, and at least once with the full committee.178 It has the
power to hire outside consultants and is guaranteed access to internal infor-

170
Veronica Root Martinez, Third Party and Appointed Monitorships, Chapter 53, in
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON COMPLIANCE CH. 53, NOTRE DAME LEGAL STUDIES PAPER NO.
200424 (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3585725.
171
Jonathan Stempel, 21st Century Fox in $90 million settlement tied to sexual harassment
scandal, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fox-settlement/21stcentury-fox-in-90-million-settlement-tied-to-sexual-harassment-scandal-idUSKBN1DK2NI.
172
Non-Monetary Relief, City of Monroe Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Murdoch, C.A. No. 20170833-AGB ¶ 4, 7 (Del. Ch. 2018).
173
Id. at ¶ 6.
174
Id.
175
Id. at ¶ 7.
176
Id. at ¶ 10–28.
177
Id. at ¶ 9-10.
178
Ironically, the Zuckerberg apology portion of the cycle appears to be at an end. The
company is now focused on a public relations campaign instead. Ryan Mac & Sheera Frenkel,
No More Apologies: Inside Facebook’s Push to Defend Its Image, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 21, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/21/technology/zuckerberg-facebook-project-amplify.html.
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mation on allegations of harassment, discrimination or retaliation at Fox
News.179 It also conducts anonymous surveys, paid for by the company.180
There are also public accountability mechanisms. The Council drafts
reports to the Board that are posted publicly.181 It is required to make recommendations to management about how to foster a harassment, discrimination, and retaliation free environment.182 It is also empowered to make
recommendations on internal reporting requirements and appropriate remedial actions.183 It was designed to engage with both Twentieth-First Century
Fox and its subsidiary, Fox News (and, thereby, eliminating any plausible
deniability at that level).184 In short, the Council is empowered to monitor the
company and work with its board to ensure that the company makes strides
in developing a better and more appropriate culture at Fox News and based
on that, to develop reports that will become public.
These are powerful mechanisms.185 They introduce friction into the
process by forcing consultation with Council members who are experts in
the field—first at the management level and then at the board level.
Although the company had input into the selection of Council members, it
did not control their selection and does not control their work.186 Instead,
the experts were judicially appointed and are empowered to do the work,
hire outside consul-tants, meet in executive sessions and more. Ironically,
these are exactly the types of governance mechanisms lacking in the
Facebook Special Committee.
Notably, Twenty-First Century Fox and Fox News were, like Facebook,
even though publicly traded, controlled by the Murdoch family. Moreover,
Roger Ailes and Bill O’Reilly, both accused of very serious sexual harassment and more, were key to the Fox News revenue model and protected by
Rupert Murdoch.187 Indeed, multiple suits against O’Reilly were settled over
179

Non-Monetary Relief, City of Monroe Emps.’ Ret. Sys., No. 2017-0833-AGB at ¶ 16-

17.
180

Id. at ¶ 20.
Id. at ¶ 15.
Id. at ¶ 21.
183
Id. at ¶ 23.
184
Id.
185
Although Disney bought most of the entertainment assets from Rupert Murdoch’s
Twenty-First Century Fox in 2019, Murdoch still owns the Fox broadcast network, Fox News
and many local Fox television stations.
186
The monitors were judicially appointed, removing competition from the market and
lowering any incentive for a monitor to succumb to corporate capture. Further, unlike auditors
and other gatekeepers, the pay of the Fox monitors is not related to the pecuniary interests of
the company, adding another layer of protection from capture. Lastly, the monitors at Fox have
reputational capital at risk – their work is transparent and other opportunities, monitoring or
not, depend on their reputation for honesty and accountability. See JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006) (analyzing the nature of
lawyers, auditors, as gatekeepers that have been complicit in fraud and scandals over time).
187
Jonathan Stempelm, 21st Century Fox in $90 million settlement tied to sexual harassment scandal, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fox-settlement/
21st-century-fox-in-90-million-settlement-tied-to-sexual-harassment-scandalidUSKBN1DK2NI; Michael M. Grynbaum & John Koblin, Fox Settles With Gretchen Carlson
181
182
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the years, with payments by Fox News, but seemingly without outside investigation. Yet, it appears that when the news of Gretchen Carlson’s suit
against Roger Ailes broke, the Murdoch brothers, James (CEO of TwentyFirst Century Fox) and Lachlan (co-chairman of Fox News), decided to hire
outside counsel to investigate the allegations.188 The rest is the subject of
documentaries, movies, extensive media coverage, and biographies.189
The result is a story of a culture in which degradation, harassment, retaliation, and discriminatory behavior were allegedly rampant. At least
twenty women came forward with sexual harassment claims.190 One woman
alleged that Ailes videotaped her and used the footage to blackmail191 her
into “pressuring other women into situations in which Ailes could harass
them.”192 Fox settled harassment claims from her.193 Ailes also reportedly
used Fox money to hire private detectives to go after his enemies—both
inside and outside the company.194 If true, this use of company money for
personal expenses was a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.195 He also
reportedly tapped phones and surveilled employees.196
That behavior is reminiscent of the British phone tapping scandal in
2011 and involved allegations of phone hacking of the Royal Family and
other celebrities and bribery to pursue news stories.197 That scandal was so
Over Roger Ailes Sex Harassment Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 6, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/business/media/fox-news-roger-ailes-gretchen-carlson-sexualharassment-lawsuit-settlement.html.
188
Rupert was unavailable, and that might well be the reason an outside law firm was
hired to do an independent investigation. Sarah Ellison, Inside the Final Days of Roger Ailes’s
Reign at Fox News, VANITY FAIR (Sep. 22, 2016) https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/09/
roger-ailes-fox-news-final-days.
189
BOMBSHELL (BRON STUDIOS 2019); Emily Crockett, Here are the women who have
publicly accused Roger Ailes of sexual harassment, VOX (Aug. 15, 2016), https://
www.vox.com/2016/8/15/12416662/roger-ailes-fox-sexual-harassment-women-list.
190
Id.
191
Gabriel Sherman, Former Fox News Booker Says She Was Sexually Harassed and
‘Psychologically Tortured’ by Roger Ailes for More Than 20 Years, N.Y. MAG. (July 29, 2016),
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2016/07/fmr-fox-booker-harassed-by-ailes-for-20-years.html.
192
Eliana Dockterman, The True Story Behind Bombshell and the Fox News Sexual Harassment Scandal, TIME (Dec. 16, 2018), https://time.com/5748267/bombshell-true-story-foxnews/.
193
Gabriel Sherman, Former Fox News Booker Says She Was Sexually Harassed and
‘Psychologically Tortured’ by Roger Ailes for More Than 20 Years, N.Y. MAG. DAILY INTELLIGENCER (July 29, 2016), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2016/07/fmr-fox-booker-harassedby-ailes-for-20-years.html.
194
Dylan Byers, Roger Ailes’ alleged use of Fox funds raises liability questions, CNN
(Aug. 8, 2016), https://money.cnn.com/2016/08/08/media/roger-ailes-consultants-21st-centuryfox-liability/index.html.
195
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“A failure
to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a
purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation. . .”)
196
Mark Hensch, Fox News staff feared Ailes was monitoring them: report, THE HILL
(Aug. 8, 2016), https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/290810-fox-news-stafffeared-ailes-was-monitoring-them.
197
Jim Rutenberg, Fox News Turmoil Recalls News Corp. Phone Hacking Scandal, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/15/business/fox-news-turmoil-recalls-news-corp-phone-hacking-scandal.html.
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damaging that it led to the resignations of Rupert Murdoch as chair of, and
James as executive chair of, News Corporation.198 In testimony for a public
inquiry in Britain, Rupert Murdoch admitted that there was a cover-up, and
the re-port issued after the inquiry noted that he was willfully blind and
not fit to run the company.199 In short, the company culture was broken.
That, it turns out, was also true of Fox News. Ailes left the company
within 15 days of Carlson filing suit.200 The internal investigation that followed was very narrow and designed to determine the company’s potential
exposure.201 Although that was a legitimate legal decision, it resulted in an
investigation that did not focus on the depth of the alleged harm and the
nature of the culture. Instead, the corporate fiduciary litigation addressed
those issues with the above-described monitor program. That program appears to have been necessary both because of the extent and nature of the
harms and because of the company’s failure to address them. Just like
Facebook.
Monitors in private civil litigation are rare, but this article contends
there are times when they are appropriate.202 Presumably, the judge and the
lawyers in the Fox News case agreed that monitors were necessary. Why?
The harm to the women was very significant, of course. It was also ongoing,
extensive, repeated,203 unaddressed, involved surveillance and blackmail,
and more. The magnitude of the harm was high and so was the probability of
more occurrences. In short, it was sustained and systemic. And it was part
of the culture—a culture where the leader, Ailes, seemingly had complete
control. And where others, like O’Reilly, Eric Bolling, Ed Henry, and Judge
Andrew Napolitano, were also terminated over sexual harassment and misconduct allegations.204

198
Christina Boyle, British phone-hacking scandal was a low point for Rupert Murdoch,
L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-british-scandal-murdoch-20150611-story.html.
199
John Hall, Rupert Murdoch ‘not a fit person’ to run News Corporation, INDEP. (May 1,
2012), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/rupert-murdoch-not-a-fit-person-torun-news-corporation-7703623.html.
200
Daniel Wiessner & Jessica Toonkel, Fox Settles Sexual Harassment Lawsuit For $20
Million on Ailes’ behalf, REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-twentyfirst-fox-ailes/fox-settles-sexual-harassment-lawsuit-for-20-million-on-ailes-behalfidUSKCN11C1J5.She had sued him personally, not the company, to avoid an arbitration
clause. Jonathan Stempel, Fox News’ Ailes moves for arbitration in Carlson employment case,
REUTERS (Jul. 8, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-foxnews-lawsuit/fox-news-ailesmoves-for-arbitration-in-carlson-employment-case-idUSKCN0ZO2I7.
201
Jim Rutenberg, Ben Protess & Emily Steel, Internal Inquiry Sealed the Fate of Roger
Ailes at Fox, THE N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/business/
media/as-an-internal-inquiry-sinks-ailes-questions-about-fox-newss-fate.html.
202
Courts have imposed monitors in civil litigation with the government, including with
the SEC, EPA, OIG, and HHS. See GARRETT, supra note 84 at 191.
203
Emily Steel & Michael S. Schmidt, Bill O’Reilly Thrives at Fox News, Even as Harassment Settlements Add Up, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/01/
business/media/bill-oreilly-sexual-harassment-fox-news.html.
204
Emily Steel & Michael S. Schmidt, Bill O’Reilly Is Forced Out at Fox News, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/19/business/media/bill-oreilly-fox-
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Murdoch, Ailes’s leader, also had power, but chose not to exercise it.
Instead, Rupert Murdoch is reported to have said, “Leave him alone . . .
[h]e knows what he is doing.”205 Presumably, Ailes did know what he
was doing in the context of building the Fox News brand and empire,
but as verified by the internal investigation and termination, leaving him
alone was not the right response. Add to that the seeming absence of the
board and internal controls, and the result was the need for external
governance.
Like Fox News, Facebook is an example of a company that might be
ready for a monitor group—one that has a focus beyond privacy and leans in
on social license, publicness, and corporate governance.206 The approach
may be appropriate here because the harm Facebook imposes is not just
about user privacy, it is about stakeholders and about shareholders; it is
about young girls, human trafficking, and elections. It is also about how, as
Parts I and II make clear, Zuckerberg appears to maintain control over
the board and has shown repeated inability to set limits.
Indeed, time and again, Facebook commits to hiring people with titles
that seemingly indicate that they will have a role in making change. Yet
change does not occur. Consider the case of Yael Eisenstat, a former CIA
officer and Facebook’s global head of elections and integrity operations. She
expressed “cautious optimism” when hired to focus on the company’s
threat to democracy, but resigned shortly thereafter, stating she was
“intentionally sidelined” on day two and never allowed to participate in
news-allegations.html; Emily Steel, Fox News Ousts Eric Bolling After Probe Into Lewd Text
Messages, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/08/business/media/
fox-news-ousts-eric-bolling-after-probe-into-lewd-text-messages.html; Michael M. Grynbaum,
Fox News Fires Ed Henry Over Sexual Misconduct Claim, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 1, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/business/media/ed-henry-fired-fox-news.html; John Koblin,
Fox News Sidelines Andrew Napolitano After Wiretap Allegation, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/21/nyregion/fox-news-sidelines-andrew-napolitano-afterwiretap-allegation.html.
205
Sarah Ellison, Inside the Final Days of Roger Ailes’s Reign at Fox News, VANITY FAIR
(Sep. 22, 2016), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/09/roger-ailes-fox-news-final-days.
206
Privacy and concerns about it are, of course, important to many Facebook users. The
FTC has attempted to address the privacy concerns with several measures. It has demanded
that the board create a privacy committee, composed of independent directors, who can be
removed only with a supermajority vote. That committee will oversee designated privacy compliance officers, who must make reports internally and to the FTC on privacy matters. In
addition, the FTC settlement requires a third-party assessor on privacy, appointed with FTC
approval and subject to reporting obligations. There are other provisions as well, but all are
privacy related. See Complaint, United States v. Facebook, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 3d. 115 (D.D.C.
2020) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/182_3109_facebook_complaint_
filed_7-24-19.pdf; FED. TRADE COMM’N., supra note 74.
In theory, the Privacy Committee is a good step for a board that has been unable to manage
these issues. Whether it is effective remains to be seen. Given past practice, the recent issues
with the Ad Observatory, and the fact that one of the members of the Privacy Committee,
which is required to be composed solely of independent members, is a former employee of the
Chan Zuckerberg Foundation certainly gives pause. Rob Price, Facebook has appointed the
‘privacy committee’ on its board designed to prevent another Cambridge Analytica scandal,
BUS. INSIDER (May 13, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-announces-privacycommittee-board-of-directors-2020-5.
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meetings about the very issues for which she was hired.207
She is not alone. Also in 2020, Ashok Chandwaey, a software engineer,
left the company. Why? Because he “[could] no longer stomach contributing to an organization that is profiting off hate in the US and globally”. He
pointed to the violence fueled in Myanmar by Facebook (the UN cited
Facebook as a leading cause) and for which Facebook created a separate
committee to examine issues (again) and violence in Kenosha, Wisconsin,
among others. He also said that although Facebook created a Civil Rights
Commission to help it address issues, the company ignored its advice.208
But, these are not “privacy” issues. They are governance issues.
Employees have said that company town halls feel pressured. They
need to “act as though everything is fine and that [they] love working
[there].” 209 They describe the culture as requiring them to elevate Facebook
and follow orders, i.e., do not dissent or speak up. Rather than a place that
encourages people to speak up, employees say that the company is an echo
chamber.210 Diverse employees have departed, citing both the lack of diversity at the company and the bullying they faced when they raised the
issue.211 Transparency, dialogue, and the resulting creative friction seem to be
missing. Again, these are also not privacy issues. They are about culture,
choices at the top, and the company’s board and governance.
Add to that the notable departure of Frances Haugen along with her
whistleblower complaints. And, of course, the board members who resigned in rapid succession: Bowles, Hastings, Desmond-Hellman, and Chenault. Indeed, although Facebook is large, and, therefore, size alone might
result in departures and complaints from many, it is impossible to dismiss
the departures of four directors in a short period of time and the massive
detail in the Haugen documents.
This is where governance matters and for Facebook, where external
support is vital. External monitors bring perspective and expertise.212 They

207
Ian Tucker, Yael Eisenstat: “Facebook is ripe for manipulation and viral misinformation”, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 26, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jul/26/
yael-eisenstat-facebook-is-ripe-for-manipulation-and-viral-misinformation.
208
Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Another Facebook worker quits in disgust, saying the company “is on the wrong side of history”, THE WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/09/08/facebook-employee-quit-racism.
209
Salvador Rodriguez, Inside Facebook’s ‘cult-like’ workplace, where dissent is discouraged and employees pretend to be happy all the time, CNBC (Jan. 8, 2019), https://
www.cnbc.com/2019/01/08/cnbcs-salvador-rodriguez-inside-facebooks-cult-like-workplacewhere-dissent-is-discouraged-and-employees-pretend-to-be-happy-all-the-time.html.
210
Id.
211
Salvador Rodriguez, Facebook manager says in internal post she quit after being
‘harassed’ over views on diversity, CNBC (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/17/
facebook-manager-quits-after-being-harassed-over-views-on-diversity.html.
212
See Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New
Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1729, 1736 (2007).
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also bring power and reform.213 In government-imposed monitor agreements,
their roles range from fact-finding and reporting to recommendations about
governance and culture.214 The DOJ recommends that criminal monitors be
restricted to specific wrongdoing, and a monitor appointed through corporate
civil litigation presumably would have appropriate limits as well. Thus, the
Fox News monitors are focused on employment and human resources issues,
and any monitors at Facebook should be focused on internal controls and
providing friction in the board’s governance process.215
Like the criminal approach, civilly imposed monitors can serve the
same key goals of punishment: deterrence, incapacitation of wrongdoing,
and rehabilitation/reform, while working cooperatively with the company.216
They can help to deter bad acts, like acts not in good faith. Deterrence occurs
both through the costs of monitors and the actual challenges imposed by
outside oversight. It occurs for the company on whom the monitor is imposed but also on other companies that might fear the same outcome.
Properly implemented, monitors can also increase transparency, which,
in turn, can help to further the second goal, incapacitating wrongdoing.217
For example, monitor oversight makes it harder for corporate actors to make
bad decisions or to, in the case of Facebook, continue to deny, admit, and
apologize and move on without real change. Further public monitoring report requirements, like those at Fox, mean that shareholders and stakeholders
alike know what choices the company is making and why—with the added
assurance that independent experts are advising and, presumably, consenting. Indeed, this sort of publicness is likely key to an effective
monitorship.218
The final goal is rehabilitation, or actual reform. Here, the goals are
usually cultural change and the development of internal controls and procedures.219 Both changes can reduce the potential for future issues and misconduct.220 For the Facebook board, processes designed to be clean and effected
in a clean manner, i.e. not like the Special Committee, would be a powerful
start. Other potential outcomes in this space would include increased trans-

213
See generally, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n. v. WorldCom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 431
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
214
ANTHONY S. BARKOW ET AL., THE GUIDE TO MONITORSHIPS 3 (3rd ed. 2022).
215
See generally, WorldCom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 431.
216
BARKOW, supra note 214 at 10–11.
217
See Veronica Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 148–150
(2016); Jennifer O’Hare, The Use of the Corporate Monitor in SEC Enforcement Actions, 1
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 89, 99–100 (2006).
218
GARRETT, supra note 84, at 184.
219
BARKOW ET AL., supra note 214 at 8; see also Veronica Root. The Monitor-Client
Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV. 523, 532 (2014); Christie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate
Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 734–35 (2009).
220
See Lindsey A. Gallo, Kendall Lynch, & Rimmy Tomy, Out of Site, Out of Mind? The
Role of the Government-Appointed Corporate Monitor (The Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus.,
Research Paper No. 22-07, 2022), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4027017 (noting that
monitors can reduce recidivism).
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parency and candor between board members, between officers and the
board, and between the company and its stakeholders—with fewer after-thefact apologies needed. None of this will work, however, without public accountability either through ongoing judicial monitoring or public reporting
to the shareholders.
In short, the role of external monitors is to move the company forward
on a path of sustainable change.221 When the bad behavior is sustained, systemic, and part of the strategy, as it is at Facebook, the monitors will need to
work to improve the company’s culture of compliance by working with management.222 Thus, as at Fox, the appropriate members of management must
be part of the conversation and the solution. There, members of the human
resources team partner with the board and the monitors.223 Note the importance of the plural here. Fox has a group of monitors thus enhancing accountability and decreasing potential capture issues.224 Facebook would need
a similar structure, but because the problems extend well beyond user privacy concerns, the monitors need internal participants who manage election,
human trafficking, and other issues.
This partnership factor is key and is ensured through transparency.225 A
Facebook monitoring council must be empowered to report both to appropriate and actually independent board members and the stakeholding public.
Notably at Fox, the public accountability mechanisms include more than
just public reports; they include an option for minority reports. Presumably,
this provision was designed to ensure that individual monitors are able to
preserve their integrity and to make their concerns known when necessary.
Importantly, at Facebook, absent whistleblowers, this type of transparency
does not exist now and is, arguably, shamed and pressured from the top
down. Thus, implementing it would help Facebook progress on both the deterrence and rehabilitation goals of monitoring more generally.
The Fox Council has other powers that, as described above, are similar
to the internal controls important to good corporate governance and should
be part of a Facebook monitoring council. The powers delegated to the council should be broad and include, for example, the power to investigate stakeholder issues, responses to internal complaints, and more. Where necessary,
the council should have the power to hire its own consultants so that it can
focus its efforts on where to incapacitate, or decrease, wrongdoing and
where rehabilitation is necessary.
Surveys are also an important element for monitors. In a culture like
Facebook’s where dissent is seemingly discouraged and dismissed, the
monitors need to hear directly from employees about the climate, the
culture, and the challenges of raising issues involving stakeholders. Not all
221

BARKOW ET AL., supra note 214, at 11–12.
Id. at 12; see Root, supra note 217 at 135–36.
223
GARRETT, supra note 84, at 185.
224
See supra note 186.
225
See Root, supra note 219, at 555.
222
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employees can afford to leave, let alone to leave with a noisy exit. Still
others would like to stay and continue to further Facebook’s mission, within
bounds. Anonymous survey mechanisms can help provide information to
the monitors and to the board about where the gaps, challenges, and
frustrations currently exist. Solutions, of course, must follow, but the
information is a key early step in determining what the approaches to
decrease wrongdoing might be, which might be sustainable, and where
rehabilitation is possible or change is needed.
The final key mechanism in the Fox approach is the five-year term,
with required disclosure and transparency around any decision to discontinue it. Although it remains to be seen if five years is sufficient, the Fox
Council is given time to investigate and opine on the challenges and propose
solutions to the opportunities.226 It can determine whether culture changes, if
any, are gaining traction. It can weigh whether the board is paying appropriate attention and if board members are raising good questions and questioning answers. As we have seen, those internal controls are key to good
governance and to the protection of stakeholders, and at Fox, the employees.
Importantly, if at the five-year mark, the board decides to eliminate the
Council, it must share its reasoning publicly. This is transparency. It is accountability. It builds on the other mechanisms, and it is backed by the securities laws and the fact that members of the Council would not,
presumably, quietly go along with a statement with which they did not
agree. In short, discontinuation requires consensus that the deterrence function is no longer needed, that mechanisms for addressing wrongdoing are in
place and working, and that rehabilitation is underway.
Taken together, the elements of the monitoring approach at Fox have
considerable promise. What we do not know of course, is whether they will
be successful. Nor do we know enough about whether monitors generally
are. There are examples of successful cultural and corporate changes in some
instances, like Richard Breeden at Worldcom and Dr. Theo Waigel at Siemens. These monitorships both uncovered additional wrongdoing and cultural issues and also appear to have had real impacts in shifting the culture
over time. Further, recent data suggest the presence of corporate monitors
does reduce recidivism rates and future misconduct throughout the term of
the monitorship.227 The data also, however, indicate that absent long-term
cultural change, the power of the monitorship may end when the monitor

226
The critical inquiry with respect to the time involved in a monitorship is about the
nature of the engagement with the organization and its employees. Dr. Waigel spent four years
at Siemens, but made strong progress by taking 1500 meetings and being physically present in
the building. Indeed, Siemens gave him the “best office” in the building. Retired U.S. district
judge Frederick B. Lacey monitored Bristol-Myers-Squibb for only two years and declared the
company “transformed.” But, in the same report, Judge Lacey acknowledged BMS had recently pleaded guilty again, this time for lying to the FTC. Garrett, supra note 84, at 191–92.
227
Gallo, supra note 220 at 5.
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exits, raising questions about whether and how to determine the length or
termination of a monitorship.228
Thus, to see the real value of monitors, we need to consider what success looks like and then begin to measure it. There are several ways in which
we might do that. For example, it makes sense for monitors to engage in the
collection of qualitative data on the company and its culture at the beginning
and throughout the monitoring process. There are multiple forms of assessment in existence for corporate culture, and those might provide a starting
point. We also need real accountability for monitors. Public reporting measures, as at Fox, are vital. They provide accountability to investors and to
stakeholders, and as this article argues, both would be vitally important in
the case of Facebook. Periodic judicial review and reports, supplementing
public reporting, might also be a good buttress, particularly in criminal
matters.229
With respect to the monitors themselves, it is important to assess what
types of individual backgrounds are effective in which situations. Of course,
some familiarity with the issue(s) to be monitored or remedied matter,
like sexual harassment at Fox. Indeed, the Fox monitoring group appears to
have been designed to compensate for what was otherwise a toxic culture
lacking in internal controls. Nevertheless, it is also possible that a true
governance expert would have been a value add at Fox, because the problem
was not just an “HR” issue. It was also a board level governance problem.
The company had a pattern of settling with victims and not being transparent
with Twenty-First Century Fox. Perhaps Rupert Murdoch knew, but
information was not shared transparently with the board. That lack of
candor produced an envi-ronment in which sexual harassment and
degradation allegedly flourished. As the case study in this article reveals, at
Facebook, stakeholder and investor harm seems to flourish, and will
continue to do so absent internal controls and improved board-level
governance.
CONCLUSION
The challenge that this article has made clear is that Facebook’s reach is
global—and so are its harms. If the company were dumping toxic sludge
into the water supplies of multiple countries, including the United States and
Europe, it is reasonable to think that regulators would have stopped it by
now. In fact, Facebook is arguably dumping toxic harm all over the world,
and a more global response might be warranted. The FTC cannot address
these stakeholder issues on its own because the issues exceed its
jurisdiction. Indeed, as the Haugen Complaints reveal, the magnitude of
the harm is literally incalculable. Facebook’s reach is as large as the

228
229

Id.
GARRETT, supra note 84, at 191–92.
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internet, and the harms are not limited to user privacy or consumer fraud.
Facebook is designed to impact stakeholders across the world, and it does.
Facebook has pledged to address some of the issues; yet, as the harm/
apology/repeat cycle and Haugen documents reveal, the likelihood of it successfully doing so in its current form is low and the likelihood of repeated
problems and harm is high. Although the FTC is attempting to address the
privacy angle of the issues, the analysis in this article reveals that the
problems at the company are seemingly, at their core, governance related.
As documents from the company indicate, the company is likely aware
of and has ignored solutions for some of the issues. Employees have
left the company over these and other issues, and directors appear to
have left the board in frustration over governance and candor.
In short, Facebook’s challenges are sustained and systemic and embedded in the company’s culture and strategy. As a result, in Zuckerberg’s
words, the company “does not deserve to serve us,” at least on its own.
Instead, as the case study and thought experiment in this article reveal,
Facebook might be a company in which achieving effective internal controls
and accountability structures might require an outside governance model.
The goal would be to shift the culture to one where transparency and social
license matter, and so do stakeholders and users.
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